State of Utah v. Graham Austin : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2005
State of Utah v. Graham Austin : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Mr. J. Frederic Voros, Jr.; Attorney General\'s Office. Attorney for Appellee.
William L. Schultz; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Austin, No. 20050134 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5577
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
GRAHAM AUSTIN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
cA 
Case No. 20050134-SC 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
THIS IS A DIRECT APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE 
ENTERED IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
THE HONORABLE LYLE R. ANDERSON, JUDGE, PRESIDING. 
-oOo-
William L. Schultz, (#3626) 
69 East Center 
P.O. Box 937 
Moab, Utah 84532 
Mr. J. Frederic Voros, Jr. 
Attorney General's Office 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
FILED 
ORAL ARGUMENT/PUBLISHED OPINION REQUEgf^pf APPELLATE COURTS 
S E P - 6 2005 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. : 
GRAHAM AUSTIN, 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
Case No. 20050134-SC 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
THIS IS A DIRECT APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE 
ENTERED IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
THE HONORABLE LYLE R. ANDERSON, JUDGE, PRESIDING. 
O0o 
William L. Schultz, (#3626) 
69 East Center 
P.O. Box 937 
Moab, Utah 84532 
Mr. J. Frederic Voros, Jr. 
Attorney General's Office 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
ORAL ARGUMENT/PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS, 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 7 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 14 
ARGUMENT 16 
I. THE REASONABLE DOUBT JURY INSTRUCTION FAILED TO 
ACCURATELY STATE THE LAW 16 
II THE TRIAL COURT EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF ITS 
AUTHORITY IN ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY 
SENTENCING DEFENDANT TO CONSECUTIVE TERMS 
WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF A PRESENTENCE 
INVESTIGATION REPORT 21 
CONCLUSION 27 
ADDENDUM 
A. Judgment and Commitment to the Utah State Prison, 
dated February 4, 2005. 
B. Jury Instruction No. 7 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Caselaw: Page 
Ames v. Maas, 846 P.2d 468, 471, (Utah App. 1993) . . . . 2 
DeBose v. People, 175 Colo. 356, 488 P.2d 69 22 
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362, 90 S. Ct. 1068 25 L.Ed.2d 
368 (1970) 16 
State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App.1991) . 26 
State v. Archuleta,850 P.2d 1232, 1244 (Utah 1993) . . . 2 
State v. Brvant, 965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah Ct.App.1998). . 27 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208- 09 (Utah 1993) . . . 26 
State v. Gerrard. 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978) . . . . 3,22 
State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, 40 P. 3d 626, . . . . 2,15,21,22 
State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991) . . . 26 
State v. Ireland. 773 P.2d 1375, 1380-82 (Utah 1989) . . 17 
State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5 Utah App.,1996c25 26 
State v. Lehman, 2004 UT App. 404 2,21 
State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994) 26 
State v. Mecham. 9 P. 3d 777, Utah App., 2000 26 
State ex. rel. T.M.. 2003 UT App. 191,73 P3d 959, . . 15,21 
State v. Reves, 2004 UT App 8,84 P.3d 841 2,21 
State v. Reves, 2005 UT 33 15,16,17,18,19,21 
State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997) . . . 16,19,21 
State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9,84 P. 3d 854 . . . .3,22 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 693, 104 
S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 2066-67, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) . . . . 27 
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993) 16 
U.S. v. Rose,185 F.3d 1108, C.A.10 (Okla.),1999 23 
Rulesr Statutes and Constitutions: 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, Amends. VI 3,20 
UTAH CONSTITUTION, Art. I § 7 3,20 
UTAH CODE ANN.§77-18a-l (1) (a) 1 
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 76-3-401 3,15,22 
UTAH CODE ANN.§76-3-401(1)(2000) 3,15,22 
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 76-3-401(2) 3,15 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 3(a) 3 
18 U.S.C. §§ 3584 (a) 23 
18 U.S.C. §§ 3553 (a) 23,24 
Other 
American Bar Association Standards of Criminal Justice 
Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures, § 
3.4(iii) 23 
Steve Sheppard, The Metamorphoses of Reasonable Doubt: How 
Changes in the Burden of Proof Have Weakened the 
Presumption of Innocence, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1165 
(2003) 19 
ii 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
GRAHAM AUSTIN, 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
Case No* 20050134-SC 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
UTAH CODE ANN. §77-18a-l (1) (a) and Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure 3(a) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this 
appeal from the Judgment and Commitment to the Utah State 
Prison entered February 4, 2005, in this case involving 
convictions of Murder, a first degree felony; Aggravated 
Robbery, a second degree felony; and Interference with 
Arresting Officer, a Class B Misdeameanor from a court of 
record. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS, STATEMENT OF 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL, AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE I: Did the "reasonable doubt" jury instruction 
presented at trial correctly state the law? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Whether a jury instruction correctly 
states the law is review able under a correction of error 
standard, with no particular deference given to the trial 
court's ruling. State v. Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, 1 14, 84 P.3d 
841, citing State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1244 (Utah 
1993). Determining the propriety of the instructions 
submitted to the jury presents a question of law, which this 
Court reviews for correctness. Id. at 1 15, see, Ames v. 
Maas, 846 P.2d 468, 471 (Utah App. 1993). 
ISSUE II: Did the trial court exceed the scope of its 
authority in arbitrarily and capriciously 
sentencing Defendant to consecutive terms 
without the benefit of a presentence 
investigation report? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A trial court's sentencing decision 
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Lehman, 2004 
UT App. 404. This Court traditionally affords the trial court 
wide latitude and discretion in sentencing. State v. Helms, 
2002 UT 12 18, 40 P. 3d 626. "A trial court abuses its 
discretion in sentencing when, among other things, it fails to 
consider all legally relevant factors." Id. At 18 (quotations 
and citation omitted). Specifically, a trial court abuses its 
discretion in imposing consecutive sentences only if "no 
reasonable [person] would take the view by the [sentencing] 
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court." State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, f 12, 84 P. 3d 
854 (alterations in original) {quoting State v. Gerrard, 584 
P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978)). 
Pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-401, a trial court has 
the discretion to impose consecutive sentences when a 
defendant has been convicted of more than one felony offense. 
See UTAH CODE ANN. §76-3-401 (1) (2000). However, before a 
trial court may impose consecutive sentences, it "shall 
consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the 
history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the 
defendant." Id § 76-3-401(2). The defendant has the burden 
to demonstrate that the trial court did not consider the 
factors set forth in § 76-3-401(2). Helms at 116. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AMEND. VI 
UTAH CONSTITUTION ART. I § 7 
UTAH CODE ANN. §7 6-3-4 01 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On May 9, 2004, Walter Pratt (hereinafter "Pratt") was 
allegedly stabbed to death in his truck and camper by Graham 
Austin (hereinafter "Austin") on River Road. Tr. Vol. I at 
pp.62, 63. Ms. Heather Meacham and her four children 
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allegedly witnessed the murder on their way to a graduation in 
Colorado. Tr. Vol. I at p. 72. Ms. Meacham testified that 
they were pursued by Austin in Pratt's truck. Tr. Vol. I at 
p. 78. She testified that she passed Lucinda and Thomas 
Collins (the "Collinses") by the side of the road and stopped 
to tell them that she and her children had witnessed some type 
of assault and that the suspect was coming down the road. Tr. 
Vol. I p. 79. Ms. Meacham warned the Collinses, that they 
might be in danger and that they should leave, then drove 
away. Id. 
The Collinses testified that they got into their car and 
saw the truck and camper come barreling down the road. Tr. 
Vol. I at p. 129. They testified that they followed Austin to 
the highway, were able to get in front of him, get his license 
plate and vehicle description and call it into the highway 
patrol. Tr. Vol. I at pp. 129, 130. They then stop at mile 
marker 10 in Colorado and the truck and camper never come pass 
them. Tr. Vol. I at pp. 130, 131. 
At this time, Officer Andy Peterson and Officer Darrell 
Meacham (hereinafter "Officer Meacham")begin searching for the 
victim's vehicle. Tr. Vol. I at p. 148. Officer Peterson 
testified that he headed down the Pipeline Road, spotted what 
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appeared to be dual wheel tracks, and came upon the truck and 
camper. Id. Officer Peterson testified that he observed 
Austin getting out of the vehicle, that he called out to 
Austin and informed him that he was a police officer and to 
stop, but that Austin did not respond to his command and took 
off on foot. Tr. Vol. I at pp. 150, 151. 
Officers Peterson and Meacham testified they followed 
Austin to a culvert. Tr. Vol. I at p. 151. They discovered 
Austin under a tree and order him to come out. Id. Austin 
would not come out voluntarily so Officer Peterson pulled him 
out by his feet. Tr. Vol. I at p. 153. Officer Peterson 
testified that he then frisked Austin and found a bloody knife 
in his pocket. Id. Once Austin was arrested, Officer 
Peterson handcuffed him and took him to Officer Manson's 
vehicle with the Grand County Sheriff's Department. Tr. Vol. 
I at p. 157. 
On May 17, 2004, Austin was charged by Information with 
Murder, a First-Degree Felony. R001-R002. On June 16, 2004, 
in an Amended Information, Austin was charged with Murder, a 
First-Degree Felony; Aggravated Robbery, a First-Degree 
Felony; Obstruction of Justice, a Second Degree Felony, and 
Interference with an Arresting Officer; a Class B Misdemeanor. 
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R038-040. On January 27, 2005, in a Second Amended 
Information, Austin was charged with Murder, a First-Degree 
Felony; Aggravated Robbery, a First-Degree Felony; and 
Interference with an Arresting Officer, a Class B Misdemeanor. 
R0111-R0113. 
On February 2, 3, and 4, 2005, this matter came for trial 
before the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson. Tr. Vol. I and II at 
p. 6. On February 4, 2005, Austin was found guilty of First-
Degree Murder, Theft of an Operable Motor Vehicle, and 
Interference with an Arresting Officer. Tr. Vol. II at p.157. 
Austin waived his right to delay sentencing and on February 4, 
2005, was sentenced to five years to life in the Utah State 
Prison on the charge of Murder in the First Degree, with a 
consecutive term of one to 15 years in the Utah State Prison 
for Theft of an Operable Motor Vehicle and six months on the 
Interference with an Arresting Officer charge. Tr. Vol. II at 
p. 172. On February 4, 2005, this Court entered its Judgement 
and Commitment to Utah State Prison, (hereinafter the 
"Judgement") in this matter (R0177-R0181). On February 10, 
2005 Austin filed his Notice of Appeal from the Judgement 
entered with respect to this matter. (R0182-R0183). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 9, 2004, Walter Pratt (hereinafter "Pratt") was 
allegedly stabbed to death in his truck and camper by Graham 
Austin (hereinafter "Austin") on River Road, Tr. Vol. I at 
pp.62, 63. Ms. Heather Meacham and her four children 
allegedly witnessed the murder on their way to a graduation in 
Colorado. Tr. Vol. I at p.72. Ms. Meacham testified that she 
witnessed Austin pulling Pratt out of the truck and thought 
that Pratt was having a heart attack and slowed down to offer 
help with CPR; however, as she slowed down, she realized that 
she was witnessing an assault and drove away. Tr. Vol. I at 
pp. 75-76. 
As Ms. Meacham drove away she testified that she glanced 
in the rear view mirror and noticed Austin walking back across 
the street and Pratt's body on the side of the road hunched 
over in the sagebrush. Id. As she drove eastbound, she 
glanced in her rear view mirror a few miles down the road and 
saw Austin right behind her in Pratt's truck, so she sped up 
trying to get away from Austin. Tr. Vol. I at p. 78. She 
testified that she passed another vehicle on the road and 
Austin followed right behind. Tr. Vol. I at p. 78. 
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Ms. Meacham testified that, as she approached the turn-
off to Cisco that leads to 1-70, she no longer saw Austin 
behind her. Id. She testified that she drove by the 
Collinses on the side of the road and that she stopped and 
told them that she and her children have witnessed some type 
of assault and that the suspect is coming down the road. Tr. 
Vol. I p. 79. She testified that she warned the Collinses 
that they may be in danger and that they should leave. Id. 
The Collinses testified that they get into their car and 
saw the truck and camper come barreling down the road. Tr. 
Vol. I at p. 129. They testified that they began following 
Austin, were able to pass him, obtained his license plate and 
vehicle description and informed the highway patrol. Tr. Vol. 
I at pp. 129, 130. The Collinses then stopped at mile marker 
10 in Colorado and waited for the truck to drive by, but it 
never did. Tr. Vol. I at pp. 130, 131. 
During this time, Mr. Chris Garland ("Garland") , 
testified that he drove upon the crime scene and saw Pratt 
stagger across the road, from what appeared to be in front of 
his vehicle. Tr. Vol. I at pp. 103, 104, 105. Garland 
testified that he approached Pratt to see if he was okay but 
could not get any response from him. Tr. Vol. I at p. 104. 
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Garland testified that he then walked back to his vehicle and 
dialed 911 on his cell phone, and reported to 911 dispatch 
what he thought was a hit and run. Tr. Vol. I at p. 105. 
Mr. David Brown ("Brown") testified that he was on his 
way to work when he came upon the scene at which Garland was 
on his cell phone. Tr. Vol. I pp. 110, 111. Seeing Garland 
on his cell phone in the middle of the road, Brown testified 
that he thought the situation was under control. Id. As 
Brown drove past, however, he testified that he noticed 
Pratt's body on the side of the road, so he came back and 
approached Garland, who was still on his cell phone with the 
Sheriff's Office. Tr. Vol. I. P. 111. 
The Sheriff's Office dispatcher asked Garland to see if 
Pratt was still breathing. Tr. Vol. I at p. 112. Garland 
testified that he did not know how to do this and asked Brown 
if he would. Id. Brown testified that he rolled Pratt over, 
checked for a pulse, and tried to get an airway open. Brown 
testified that he could not find a pulse and he discovered 
that Pratt's eyes were fixed and dilated. Tr. Vol. I at p. 
113. Brown testified that he then told Garland to inform the 
dispatcher that Pratt was dead and they would not need an 
ambulance. Tr. Vol. I at p. 114. Brown testified that he then 
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realized they could be in the middle of a murder scene, and 
told Garland not to touch anything and wait for the Sheriff 
and highway patrol to arrive. Id. 
Officer Louis Manson ("Manson") who is with the Sheriff's 
department testified that he arrived on the scene and saw 
three vehicles on the side of the road and the victim on the 
left shoulder. Tr. Vol. I at p. 116. He testified that he 
checked the victim and found no pulse, and then spoke with the 
witnesses. Id. One of the cars on the side of the road was 
a red Ford and it did not belong to either of the witnesses. 
Id. Manson testified that he checked the plates of the Ford 
and found it registered to Graham Austin of Clifton, Colorado. 
Manson also testified that he discovered from the victim's 
driver's license that his name was Walter Pratt of South 
Dakota. Tr. Vol. I at p. 117. 
Manson testified that he checked Pratt for signs of 
trauma to see if it was a hit and run accident and discovered 
stab wounds. Manson testified that he informed dispatch that 
they had a homicide and asked for detectives to be sent to the 
scene. Tr. Vol. I at p. 118. Manson testified that he then 
took statements from the witnesses. Id. 
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As the homicide scene is being secured, Officer Andy 
Peterson, (hereinafter "Peterson") a highway patrol trooper 
testified that he was called out to help locate the victim's 
vehicle. Tr. Vol. I at p. 145. Peterson testified that, as 
he began his search, he heard over the radio that it was a 
homicide case and not a hit and run. Id. He received 
information that the victim's vehicle is headed towards 
Colorado, and that it had been followed by a couple who are 
stopped at Mile marker 10 and have not yet seen the vehicle 
drive by. Tr. Vol. I at p. 146. 
Peterson testified that he met up with Officer Darrell 
Meacham (hereinafter "Officer Meacham") and they proceeded in 
opposite directions looking for the victim's vehicle. Tr. 
Vol. I at p. 148. Peterson testified that he began looking 
for the camper and truck and headed to an area that was well 
known to him where many campers go. Peterson testified he 
met up with what is known as the Pipeline Road and spotted 
what appeared to be dual wheel tracks. Tr. Vol. I at p. 14 9. 
Having received information that the victim's vehicle was a 
one-ton pickup truck with a camper on it, Peterson testified 
that he proceeded down the road and came upon the truck and 
camper. Id. Peterson testified that he then informed 
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dispatch and Officer Meacham that he had found the suspect 
vehicle. Tr. Vol. I at p. 150 
While Peterson was waiting for the arrival of Officer 
Meacham, he testified that Austin got out of the truck. Tr. 
Vol. I at p. 150. Peterson testified that he called out to 
Austin, informed him that he was a police officer, and 
commanded him to stop. Tr. Vol. I at pp. 150, 151. Peterson 
testified that Austin did not respond to his command, and took 
off on foot. Id. 
Once Officer Meacham arrived, he testified that he and 
Officer Peterson proceeded to follow Austin down a trail to a 
culvert. Tr. Vol. I at p. 151. Officer Meacham testified 
that he discovered Austin on the opposite of the culvert under 
a tree and ordered him to come out. Id. Officer Meacham 
testified that Austin refused to come out voluntarily so 
Officer Peterson pulled him out by his feet. Tr. Vol. I at 
p. 153. 
Officer Peterson testified that he then frisked Austin 
and found a bloody knife in his pocket. Id. Once Austin is 
arrested, Officer Peterson testified that he handcuffed him 
and took him to Manson' s vehicle who had been sent to the 
scene. Tr. Vol. I pp. 122, 123, 157. 
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Manson testified that, as Austin was taken into custody, 
he uttered the statement "Just shoot me." Tr. Vol. I at p. 
123. Manson testified that he accompanied Austin to the 
hospital to stitch a cut on his finger. Id. The next day, 
Officer Kent Green ("Green") testified that Austin asked him 
if the man he stabbed died. When Green replied that Pratt had 
died, he testified that Austin said, "Oh, Lord, please forgive 
me. I've killed a man." Tr. Vol. I at p. 173. Green also 
testified that Austin made several other statements to him 
about what a terrible person he was. Tr. Vol. I at p. 175. 
On May 17, 2004, Austin was charged by Information with 
Murder, a First-Degree Felony. R001-R002. On June 16, 2004, 
in an Amended Information, Austin was charged with Murder, a 
First-Degree Felony; Aggravated Robbery, a First-Degree 
Felony; Obstruction of Justice, a Second Degree Felony; and 
Interference with an Arresting Officer, a Class B Misdemeanor. 
R038-040. On January 27, 2005, in a Second Amended 
Information, Austin was charged with Murder, a First-Degree 
Felony, Aggravated Robbery, a First-Degree Felony, and 
Interference with an Arresting Officer, a Class B Misdemeanor. 
R0111-R0113. 
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On February 2, 3, and 4, 2005, this matter came to trial 
before the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson. Tr. Vol. I and II at 
p. 6. On February 4, 2005, Austin was found guilty of First-
Degree Murder, Theft of an Operable Motor Vehicle, and 
Interference with an Arresting Officer. Tr. Vol. II at p.157. 
Austin waived his right to delay sentencing and on February 4, 
2005, was sentenced to five years to life in the Utah State 
Prison on the charge of Murder in the First Degree with a 
consecutive term of one to 15 years in the Utah State Prison 
for Theft of an Operable Motor Vehicle and six months on the 
Interference with an Arresting Officer charge. Tr. Vol. II at 
p. 172. On February 4, 2005, this Court entered its Judgement 
and Commitment to Utah State Prison, (hereinafter the 
"Judgement") in this matter (R0177-R0181). On February 10, 
2005 Austin filed his Notice of Appeal from the Judgement 
entered with respect to this matter. (R0182-R0183). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court determined in a decision handed 
down on June 7, 2005, that the element of "'obviate all 
reasonable doubt" in a reasonable doubt jury instruction 
carried with it the substantial risk of causing a juror to 
find guilt based on a degree of proof below beyond a 
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reasonable doubt. State v. Reves, 2005 UT 33, 530. With such 
a risk inherent in the use of the phrase "eliminate all 
reasonable doubt," a juror may have found Austin guilty under 
a standard less than that of beyond a reasonable doubt, 
violating Austin's due process rights under both the Utah 
Constitution and United States Constitution. Although not 
specifically objected to at trial, this Court previously held 
that the "[e]xceptional circumstances concept may be employed 
as basis for reaching issues not properly preserved for 
appeal, where a change in law or the settled interpretation of 
law colors the failure to have raised an issue at trial." 
State ex. rel. T.M., 2003 UT App. 191, 516, 73 P3d 959. 
Pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §76-3-401, a trial court has the 
discretion to impose consecutive sentences when a defendant 
has been convicted of more than one felony offense. See UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-3-401 (1) (2000). However, before a trial court 
may impose consecutive sentences, it "shall consider the 
gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history, 
character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Id § 
76-3-401(2). The defendant has the burden to demonstrate that 
the trial court did not consider the factors set forth in § 
76-3-401 (2) . Helms at qri6. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE REASONABLE DOUBT JURY INSTRUCTION 
FAILED TO ACCURATELY STATE THE LAW. 
No person accused in the United States may be convicted 
of a crime unless each element of the offense has been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt. In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 
362, 90 S. Ct. 1068 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (emphasis added), 
the United States Supreme Court has assigned this standard of 
proof constitutional status, linking it to both the Fifth 
Amendment right to due process of law and the Sixth Amendment 
right to a jury trial. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 
278 (1993); Winship, 397 U.S. at 362, 364. xx[T]he Due Process 
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime with which he is charged." Winship, 397 
U.S. at 364, 90 S. Ct. at 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). 
The Utah Supreme Court has recently overturned its 
holding in State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997) 
setting forth a three-part test for determining whether a 
reasonable doubt jury instruction was improper. State v. 
Reyes, 2005 UT 33, II. The first part of Robertson required 
the instruction to indicate that the State must "obviate all 
reasonable doubt." The original concept of this prong 
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appeared"...to derive from a fear that in ascertaining the 
conviction of the truth of a charge against a defendant, a 
juror might misapply the ^beyond a reasonable doubt' standard 
unless she is required to search out, confront, and defeat 
reasonable doubt with evidence." Reyes at ! 25. 
The Utah Supreme Court revisited this prong in Reyes and 
determined to abandon it based on the fact that the element of 
"obviate all reasonable doubt" carried with it the substantial 
risk of causing a juror to find guilt based on a degree of 
proof below beyond a reasonable doubt. Reyes at 1 30. The 
Utah Supreme Court undertook the following analysis: 
125 The court of appeals found merit in Mr. Reyes's 
claim that the trial court erred when it failed to 
expressly instruct that the State's proof must 
"obviate all reasonable doubt" as mandated by 
Robertson. Id. at 519. The "obviate all 
reasonable doubt" test found life in Justice 
Stewart's dissent in State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 
1375, 1380-82 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
There, Justice Stewart took issue with an 
instruction that equated "beyond a reasonable doubt" 
with "an abiding conviction of the truth of the 
charge." Id. He reasoned that since the standard to 
be applied is "beyond a reasonable doubt," it 
followed that any definition of the standard must 
reference the obstacle-reasonable doubt-to be 
overcome by the evidence, and must convey the 
principle that the State must surmount the obstacle 
of reasonable doubt to justify a conviction. Id. 
The "obviate all reasonable doubt" concept appears 
to derive from a feat that in ascertaining the 
conviction of the truth of a charge against a 
defendant, a juror might misapply the "beyond a 
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reasonable doubt" standard unless she is required to 
search out, confront, and defeat reasonable doubt 
with evidence. 
526 Insightful and important as Justice Stewart's 
image of "beyond a reasonable doubt" may be, his 
suggestion that the jury be instructed to "obviate 
all reasonable doubt" is both linguistically opaque 
and conceptually suspect. Not every jury will 
confront evidence in its deliberations sufficient to 
create a reasonable doubt. The notion of 
"obviating" doubt is cumbersome at best where proof 
is scant or lacking in credibility. In these 
instances, a description of "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" that asks jurors to rate the magnitude of 
their conviction concerning the strength of the 
evidence imparts a more accurate and useful concept 
of "beyond a reasonable doubt" than does a construct 
that requires jurors to identify doubts and assess 
whether the evidence overcomes them. A universal 
application of the notion that the State must 
"obviate all reasonable doubt" can be achieved only 
by tying it to the concept of the presumption of 
innocence. If innocence is thought of as an array 
of inchoate reasonable doubts that the State must 
overcome to attain a conviction, it follows that the 
State must "obviate all reasonable doubt" in every 
case. We do not, however, endorse this unwieldy 
view of the presumption of innocence. 
527 The process suggested by the "obviate all 
reasonable doubt" standard is also flawed because, 
contrary to its purpose, it tends to diminish the 
degree of proof necessary to convict and in that 
respect violates the Victor standard. The 
"obviation" of doubt contemplates a two-step 
undertaking: the identification of the doubt and a 
testing of the validity of the doubt against the 
evidence. This process suggests a back and forth 
disputation of a doubt's merits, all to the end of 
determining whether the evidence is sufficient to 
"obviate" the doubt. The "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" standard does not, however, condition a 
conclusion that a doubt is reasonable on an ability 
either to articulate the doubt or to state a reason 
for it. An unarticulated conviction that the State 
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has failed to meet its burden of proof will serve as 
a legitimate basis to acquit. 
*8 528 To the extent that the Robertson "obviate" 
test would permit the State to argue that it need 
only obviate doubts that are sufficiently defined, 
the test works to improperly diminish the State's 
burden. Writing in the Notre Dame Law Review, 
Professor Steve Sheppard criticized the expanding 
prominence of the requirement that doubts be 
articulated. Steve Sheppard, The Metamorphoses of 
Reasonable Doubt: How Changes in the Burden of Proof 
Have Weakened the Presumption of Innocence, 78 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 1165 (2003). Professor Sheppard 
summarized the central vice of this trend this way: 
A troubling conclusion that arises from the 
difficulties of the requirement of articulability is 
that it hinders the juror who has a doubt based on 
the belief that the totality of the evidence is 
insufficient. Such a doubt lacks the specificity 
implied in an obligation to "give a reason," an 
obligation that appears focused on the details of 
the arguments. Yet this is precisely the 
circumstance in which the rhetoric of the law, 
particularly the presumption of innocence and the 
state burden of proof, require acquittal. Id at 
1213. 
129 Central to our reconsideration of the merits of 
the "obviate all reasonable doubt" element of 
Robertson is our belief that the exacting demands of 
the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard can be 
clearly and fairly communicated through an 
affirmative description of the degree of conviction 
that must be attained by a juror based on the 
evidence. We see little to be gained by including 
within a "beyond a reasonable doubt" instruction the 
potentially confusing concept that every defendant 
is entitled to a presumption of reasonable doubt, 
which the State's evidence must obviate. 
130 Because we conclude that "the obviate all 
reasonable doubt" element of Robertson test carries 
with it the substantial risk of causing a juror to 
find guilt based on a degree of proof below beyond 
a reasonable doubt, we expressly abandon it. 
19 
Reyes at 5524-30. 
In the instant matter, the "reasonable doubt" jury 
instruction expressly indicates that "[i]t is the burden of 
the State to eliminate all reasonable doubt," which is 
substantively the same as the prong in Robertson requiring the 
jury instruction to state that the State must "obviate all 
reasonable doubt." R14 9. As indicated by the Utah Supreme 
Court, this instruction carries with it the substantial risk 
that a juror found Austin guilty based on a degree of proof 
below beyond a reasonable doubt. With such a risk inherent in 
the use of the phrase "eliminate all reasonable doubt," a 
juror may have found Austin guilty under a standard less than 
that of beyond are reasonable doubt, violating Austin's due 
process rights under both the UTAH CONSTITUTION and UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION. 
While this issue surrounding the reasonable doubt jury 
instruction was not preserved by trial counsel at the trial in 
this matter, this Court should review the matter based upon 
exceptional circumstances. This Court has previously held 
that the " [exceptional circumstances concept may be employed 
as basis for reaching issues not properly preserved for 
appeal, where a change in law or the settled interpretation of 
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law colors the failure to have raised an issue at trial." 
State ex. rel. T.M. 2003 UT App 191, 516, 73 P.3d. 959. The 
original decision was handed down by this Court in State v. 
Reyes on January 15, 2004, upholding the three-part test in 
Robertson, and the prong requiring the use of the language 
"obviate all reasonable doubt." 2004 UT App 8, 84 P.3d 84. 
Review was granted by the Utah Supreme Court in that matter in 
May of 2004. The trial in the instant matter was held 
February 2-4, 2005, while review of Reyes was pending. The 
Opinion by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Reyes, 
abandoning the three-part test in Robertson was handed down on 
June 7, 2005. It is clear that this change in law, 
overturning an eight (8) year precedent in Robertson was 
clearly an unsettled interpretation of the law that colored 
the ability of Austin's trial counsel to raise the issue 
surrounding the reasonable doubt jury instruction. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF ITS AUTHORITY IN 
ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY SENTENCING DEFENDANT TO 
CONSECUTIVE TERMS WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF A 
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT. 
A trial court's sentencing decision is reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion. State v. Lehman, 2004 UT App. 404. This 
Court traditionally affords the trial court wide latitude and 
discretion in sentencing. State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, 18, 40 
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P.3d 626. "A trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing 
when, among other things, it fails to consider all legally 
relevant factors." Id atI8 (quotations and citation omitted). 
Specifically, a trial court abuses its discretion in imposing 
consecutive sentences only if x>no reasonable [person] would 
take the view by the [sentencing] court." State v. 
Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, 512, 84 P. 3d 854 (alterations in 
original) {quoting State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 
1978)) . 
Pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §7 6-3-4 01, a trial court has the 
discretion to impose consecutive sentences when a defendant 
has been convicted of more than one felony offense. See UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-3-401 (1) (2000). However, before a trial court 
may impose consecutive sentences, it "shall consider the 
gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history, 
character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Id § 
76-3-401(2) . The defendant has the burden to demonstrate that 
the trial court did not consider the factors set forth in § 
76-3-401(2). Helms at fl6. 
In DeBose v. People, 175 Colo. 356, 488 P.2d 69, the 
court stated, "[t]he Standards of Criminal Justice have 
recognized that multiple offenses may be punished, in the 
22 
discretion of the trial judge, by consecutive sentences. The 
Standards of Criminal Justice also suggest guidelines for the 
imposition of consecutive sentences. American Bar Association 
Standards of Criminal Justice Relating to Sentencing 
Alternatives and Procedures, s 3.4 (iii) states that "[t]he 
court should not be authorized to impose a consecutive 
sentence until a presentence report (sections 4.1—4.5), 
supplemented by a report of the examination of the defendant's 
mental, emotional and physical condition (section 4.6), has 
been obtained and considered." The United States Code 
addresses this issue as well under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3584 (a), 
where it states "[i]f multiple terms of imprisonment are 
imposed on a defendant at the same time , the terms may 
run concurrently or consecutively " 
The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals has held that, in 
exercising its sentencing discretion, a district court must 
consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553 (a). U.S. 
v. Rose, 185 F.3d 1108, C.A.10 (Okla.),1999. Section 3553(a) 
states: xx...[t]he court, in determining the particular 
sentence to be imposed, shall consider— (1) the nature and 
circumstances of the offense and the history and 
characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the 
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sentence imposed— (A) to reflect the seriousness of the 
offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just 
punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence 
to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further 
crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with 
needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or 
other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;. . ." 
In this matter, Austin had originally pled guilty to the 
charges and a Pre-Sentence Investigation Report had been 
commenced. However, when Austin withdrew his guilty plea, the 
report was stopped and never continued. Without a Pre-
sentence Investigation Report, the court was without 
sufficient information to consider all of the factors 
respecting his history, his remorse, and his rehabilitative 
needs. When Austin was arrested, he showed immediate remorse 
by telling officers who arrested him to "Just Shoot Me." Tr. 
Vol. I at p. 123. The day after his arrest, Austin also asked 
Green if the man he stabbed died, when Officer Green replied 
xxYes", Austin said "Oh, Lord, please forgive me. I've killed 
a man." Tr. Vol. I at p. 17 3. Austin also made several other 
statements to Green about what a terrible person he was. Tr. 
24 
Vol. I at p. 175. At his sentencing Austin gave a statement 
to the victim's family saying as follows: 
I want to say to the family there's no part that I 
could do that would fix it. Just I prayed over the 
Whole thing. I don't know why this happened to your 
beloved brother and your man. I regret very much 
that this happened. I-with all my heart wish that 
it had been me that day instead of him. It should 
have been. It should have been me that day. But 
some weird twist of fate changed everything. Words 
just can't express my remorse for your loss. I'm 
sorry. 
Tr. Vol. II at p. 170. This clearly shows that Austin was 
remorseful over what he had done. 
The trial court did not take into consideration Austin's 
prior history or mental state. While there was a warrant out 
for his arrest for a domestic violence incident in Colorado, 
no other prior history of Austin was taken into consideration 
by the trial court. His mother had been hospitalized and was 
just put in a care facility, his marriage was falling apart, 
he lost his job, and he has gone to visit his kids and his car 
broke down. Tr. Vol. I p. 142. He had also decided to 
overcome his addiction to methamphetamine. Id. When he 
arrived home from seeing his kids he was going to face 
everything—-his mother, his wife, his addiction—instead he 
fell apart and attacked Pratt. Tr. Vol. I p. 143. He fell 
apart because of emotional and mental stress he had been 
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suffering and the trial court abused its discretion by not 
taking this matter into consideration. 
State v, Irwin, 924 P.2d 5 Utah App.,1996, states that, 
"[i]t is a well-established rule that a defendant who fails to 
bring an issue before the trial court is generally barred from 
raising it for the first time on appeal. [FN2] State v. Lopez, 
886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994); State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 
920, 922 (Utah App.1991). However, three exceptions to this 
general rule are recognized in Utah. An appellate court may 
address an issue for the first time on appeal if appellant 
establishes that the trial court committed "plain error," 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208- 09 (Utah 1993); 
Archambeau, 820 P. 2d at 922; if there are "exceptional 
circumstances," id.; or in some situations, if a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel is raised on appeal even 
though, by reason of the claimed ineffectiveness, the matter 
was not raised below. See State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 
1029 (Utah 1991) 
Austin maintains that his counsel was ineffective for not 
objecting to the consecutive sentences. State v. Mecham, 9 
P.3d 777 (Utah App.2000) states that, in order to prove 
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that 
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"(1) trial counsel's performance was objectively deficient and 
(2) there exists a reasonable probability that absent the 
deficient conduct, the outcome would likely have been more 
favorable." See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-
88, 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 2066-67, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); 
State v. Brvant, 965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah Ct.App.1998)." 
Austin's trial counsel should have objected to the 
consecutive sentences as being an abuse of the court's 
discretion because, not only was there no pre-sentence report, 
but his remorse and his emotional and mental state were not 
taken into consideration. Had his trial counsel objected, he 
may have received concurrent sentence or been sentenced for a 
lesser amount of time which would have been a more favorable 
outcome for him. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Appellant 
respectfully requests that this Court remand this matter to 
the trial court for a new trial. 
DATED this day of , 2005. 
William L. Schultz 
Attorney for Graham Austin 
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Addendum ~A~ 
Judgment and Commitment to the Utah 
State Prison, 
dated February 5, 2005 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR ©RAND COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
Criminal No. 04X7-101 
Held in the Courtroom of saia Court, at Moab, Grand 
County, State of Utah/ on February 03/ 2005, present the 
Honorable Lyle R. Anderson, District Court Judge. 
THE STATB OF UTAH, 
Against: GRAHAM WOODRUFF AUSTIN, 
DOB: 03/25/1958 
JUDGMENT AND COMHITMEBNT TO UTAH STATE PRISON 
Happy J, Morgan, Grand County Attorney, for Plaintiff 
xristine Rogers, Attorney at Law, for Defendant 
This being the day and hour fixed for pronouncing 
judgment in this case, and the defendant being present in Court 
and represented by counsel, and defendant having heretofore been 
found guilty hy a jury of the offenses of: 
COUNT 1; MURDER, a. FIRST DEGREE FELONY; 
COUNT 2z THBFT OF AN OPBRAB&B MOTOR VHEICLE, a SECOND DEGREE 
FELONY; and 
COUNT 3: INTERF1EKENCE WITH ARRESTING OFFICER, a CLASS B 
MISDEMEANOR; 
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and the defendant stating to the Court that there is no legal 
reason to advance why judgment should not be pronounced, the 
Court now pronounces the judgment and sentence of the law as 
follow©, to-witx That you, GRAHAM WOODRUFF AUSTIN, are hereby 
imprisoned as follows; 
As to COUNT 1: You are hereby iftjprisoned in the UTAH STATE PRISON 
for a term of MOT LESS THAN FIVE (5) YEARS BUT HAY BE FOR LIFE. 
As to COUNT 2 M Y O U are hereby imprisoned in the UTAH STATE PRISON 
for a term of NOT t$BBS THAN ONE (1) YEAR NOR MORE THAN FIFTEEN 
(15) YEARS. 
As to COUNT 3: You ate hereby imprisoned in the GRAND COUNTY JAIL 
for a texm of SIX (6) MONTHS. 
Said prison and jail terms are to be served 
CONSECUTXVELY. After defendant serves his terms in the Utah 
State Prison he is to be returned to the Grand County Jail to 
serve his term there. 
The evidence at trial clearly convinced the court that 
Walter Pratt stopped to provide assistance to defendant, whose 
car had broken down at the side of the road. Whether defendant 
planned to murder the driver of the first car or decided to 
murder him only after Walter Pratt refused to turn over the car 
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this court does not taiow. Defendant did use a weapon uniquely 
both concealable and deadly and he viciously attacked and killed 
waiter pratt* It appears that he considered returning to the 
scene to eliminate witnesses who happened upon it, and* it is 
evident that he pursued a woman with three, children, the primary 
witnesses against him, for close to 20 miles before they managed 
to evade him. The court balievee defendant was motivated by a 
need to get to where he could purchase methamphetamine. 
The state has presented evidence that defendant 
assaulted his first wife, and thatr a matter of days before these 
crimes i he beat his second wife or mate so brutally that she 
suffered permanent brain injury. Defendant has consistently 
presented a calm and subdued demeanor in court, and has professed 
an understanding of the terrible nature of hie acts, but there is 
ample «fevidence of defendant's brutal nature• Defendant 
compounded the gravity of his attaclc on Walter Pratt by 
constructing an obviously false story about how Walter Pratt had 
solicited a sexual act. This subjected those who loved waiter 
Pratt to further trauma solely for the purpose of advancing 
defendant's effort at a lesser conviction* in all of defendant's 
conversations with law enforcement and in numerous letters to his 
family describing his crime, he never proffered this explanation 
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for his conduct. It surfaced only after hie attorney discovered 
that there were women's underwear in Walter Pratt's camper. 
while the court recognizes that the board of pardons 
and parole faces many cases like this and must keep open the 
prospect of rehabilitation est release, thi^ court counsels great 
caution in believing that this defendant can ever be permitted to 
live among his fellow humans again. 
GRAHAK WOODRUFF AUSTIN, You are hereby REMANDED to the 
custody of the Grand County Sheriff or other proper officer for 
transfer to the custody of the Utah state Prison. 
DATED this day of February, 2005. 
BY THE COURT r 
/ #&**** * * 
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I hereby c e r t i f y that on the *r day of February/ 
2005, I hand d e l i v e r e d or mailed, postage prepaid, a true and' 
correct copy of the above t o the fo l lowing; 
Kr i s t ine Rogers 
Attorney f o r Defendant 
712 Judge Bui lding 
8 Kast Broadway 
Sal t Lake City , Utah 84111 
Department of Corrections 
Adult Probation and Parole 
courthouse f i l e 
Grand County Sher i f f 
courthouse f i l e 
Grand County Attorney 
courthouse f i l e 
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Addendum ~B~ 
Jury Instruction No. 7 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
A defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. This presumption follows the defendant 
throughout the trial. If a defendant's guilt is not proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt, the defendant should be acquitted. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not proof to an absolute 
certainty. It is the burden of the State to eliminate all 
reasonable doubt. Reasonable doubt is a doubt based on reason, 
which is reasonable in view of all the evidence. Reasonable doubt 
is not a doubt based on fancy, imagination, or wholly speculative 
possibility. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is enough proof to 
satisfy the mind, or convince the understanding of those bound to 
act conscientiously, and enough to eliminate reasonable doubt. A 
reasonable doubt is a doubt that reasonable people would entertain 
based upon the evidence in the case. 
